Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 1 (1999)
|Zeitschrift:||Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte|
|Herausgeber:||Im Auftrag des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte herausgegeben von Helmut Altrichter, Horst Möller, Hans-Peter Schwarz und Andreas Wirsching|
|Preis:||Jahresabo: 66 €, Stud.abo: 38 € Mitgl.abo. hist. u pol. Fachverbände: 52,80 €, Online-Zugang: 66 €, Print- und Online-Abo 66 €|
Heinrich August Winkler: Demokratie oder Buergerkrieg. Die russische Oktoberrevolution als Problem der deutschen Sozialdemokraten und der franzoesischen Sozialisten
The German Social Democrats and the French Socialists reacted differently to the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia. In Germany, Lenin's revolutionary example was met with approval only by a minority within the internally split Marxist workers' movement, whereas in France the general attitude initially was one of satisfied acceptance. The German Social Democrats condemned the Bolshevik overthrow because it would lead to civil war and dictatorship. In France, even after the split within the Socialist movement in 1919, a considerable portion of the SFIO continued to support the revolutionary ideals of the Bolsheviks. The German Social Democrats turned away from pre-war Marxism much more resolutely than did the French Socialists. The SFIO could well afford its traditional ideology, because the Third Republic during the 1920's was not dependent upon Socialist representation within the government. The Weimar Republic, on the other hand, could never have been formed had the SPD not rejected the dogma of class struggle and been willing to reach a compromise with the moderate middle class factions.
Bogdan Musial: NS-Kriegsverbrecher vor polnischen Gerichten
The essay focusses on the problem of the transfer to Poland of more than 1,800 NS criminals from occupied German territory and the sentences received by the accused in Polish courts. First, the basic structures of the program of extradition to Poland are described, whereby the legal grounds for extradition and the Polish institutions concerned with the finding and pursuit of NS criminals are presented. Next, extradition policies and the way that they were put into practice by the occupying powers are discussed, with those of the Americans and British emphasized, since most of the extradition cases were initiated in the American and British zones. Then follows a discussion of the problem of the sentencing of the accused in Polish courts, with examination of the legal grounds for jurisdiction in Poland. After the Polish extradition system has been evaluated, the question remains whether the transferred criminals could expect receiving a fair and just court hearing according to Western standards. Finally, comes the question why NS criminals and members of the anti-communist opposition received different treatment in communist courts.
Hubert Zimmermann : Franz Josef Strauss und der deutsch-amerikanische Waehrungskonflikt in den sechziger Jahren
The widely overlooked agreement of October 1961 between German Defense Minister Strauss and the American Undersecretary of Defense Gilpatric became one of the most important international agreements the Federal Republic of Germany transacted in the 1960's. Essentially, the Strauss-Gilpatric Accord regulated the question of compensating for the foreign exchange deficit incurred by the stationing of US troops in the Federal Republic. Closer analyses reveals, however, that the real issues at hand were questions of international security and monetary policies, as well as the transatlantic alliance system. The compromise covered by the accord turned out to be one of the most important premises upon which German-American relations rested in the 1960's. American concessions in security policy corresponded to the mutually agreed upon German foreign-trade policy which foresaw a Fixed-Rate Dollar of exchange system. This agreement profoundly affected the transatlantic alliance, inasmuch as it, effectively prevented any further european cooperation in security and monetary policies.
Andreas Roedder: Reflexionen ueber das Ende der Weimarer Republik. Die Praesidialkabinette 1930-1932/33. Krisenmanagement oder Restaurationsstrategie?
The failure of the Weimar republic as a parlamentary democracy and the National Socialist assumption of power continue to raise questions about the inevitability of the course of events and the extent to which alternatives did exist. Did the form in which this particular political system developed allow for any direction at all? What solutions to the governmental crisis were weighed and taken into consideration between 1930-1933? Were the presidential cabinets oriented towards a strategy of restoration or crisis management? Within the framework of these questions, older and younger historians met in Stuttgart in September 1997 at a conference, the results of which are given here, in order to sketch perspectives for future research. The topics discussed were Bruenings chancellorship, the role of the under-secretaries, of the military and of jurisprudence, the constitutional plans of the von Papen and von Schleicher cabinets, the role of the NSDAP, as well as, the political constellation in January 1933.
Bernd Stoever: Der Fall Otto John. Neue Dokumente zu den Aussagen des deutschen Geheimdienstchefs gegenueber MfS und KGB
On the Tenth anniversary of the attempted assasination of Hitler, Otto John, a former member of the conspiracy which failed on July 20, 1944, and then Chief of the Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz, defected to the GDR after having taken part in a commermoration service in West Berlin. In a public statement, John announced that he had come to the GDR freely in protest against the West's strong-arm politics and the re-emergence of National Socialists. Above all, however, John wanted to work towards the reunification of Germany from within the GDR. However, after returning to the West on December 12, 1955, he declared that he had been abducted and that he had been forced to cooperate. Otto John maintained this version until his death in March 1997. Files in the Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit (MfS), which have recently become available, allow for a new reconstruction of the details leading to the defection. Furthermore, what John actually told the MfS and KGB can now be accurately ascertained. Despite a lingering degree of uncertainty, most of the facts indicate that John, in the tradition of the anti-Hitler opposition of July 20, 1944, which aimed to transcend politics, contacted the East on his own in order to further unification as an honest broker. John undoubtedly was a patriot; however, his political naiveté was considerable. John's recorded testimony contrasts sharply with the sworn statements he later gave, which indicate that he did disclose top secret information from the Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz. Not only did he reveal pertinent information on the Gehlen Organisation, on American and British secret service agencies, on the Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz, but, finally, also, on persons who suspected of being agents for the East's secret service.
Ilse Dorothee Pautsch / Rainer A. Blasius: Die 5. Internationale Konferenz der Herausgeber diplomatischer Akten. Eine Tagung des Auswaertigen Amts und des Instituts fuer Zeitgeschichte am 1./2. Oktober 1998 in Bonn
Rubrik: Mitarbeiter dieses Hefts
Heinrich August Winkler
Redaktion Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte
Copyright (c) 2014 by H-Net and Clio-online, all rights reserved. This work may be copied and redistributed for non-commercial, educational use if proper credit is given to the author and to the list. For other permission, please contact H-SOZ-U-KULT