Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 4 (1998)
|Zeitschrift:||Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte|
|Herausgeber:||Im Auftrag des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte herausgegeben von Helmut Altrichter, Horst Möller, Hans-Peter Schwarz und Andreas Wirsching|
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Georg Schild: Der amerikanische "Wohlfahrtsstaat" von Roosevelt bis Clinton
The structure and development of United States social policy differs from that of most other countries. Social programs were introduced later, remained more limited, and never became as popular as in Western Europe. There is a wide ranging economic and sociological debate going on about the forces shaping American social welfare policy. The article reviews some of those positions and then focuses on the political dimension of the expanding welfare state since the 1930`s. It concludes that while periods of increasing social welfare programs such as the 1930`s and 1960`s differend in terms of economic indicators, they saw similar discussions about the need of the federal government to intervene in order to improve the living conditioned of the American people. The focus on political crisis also offers an explanation for the shrinking social welfare state since the early 1980´s. Conservatives have managed to present the high costs of welfare programs as an unbearable financial burden for the middle class. President Bill Clinton`s effort to establish a universal health insurance system failed because opponents convinced the public that insurance premiums would rise significantly.
Michael Schwartz: "Euthanasie"-Debatten in Deutschand (1895-1945)
Advocating euthanasia in the sense of terminating the life of the incurably ill became problematic for modern thinking and an evolving modern society. This can be seen in the development of the discourse on emphasis shifted away from altruistic motives and increasingly moved towards utilitarianism. A declared state of national emergency was the only other alternative to utilitarianism which occured during World War I. Initially a marginal intellectual debate, the experience of the First World War promoted an unparalleled spread of the concept of euthanasia. Unlike the correlating debate on eugenics, euthanasia was not as readly acceptable in German society, although the issue was widely discussed, too. Crucially important to the debate on euthanasia was the respective political context. During the Kaiserreich as during the Weimar Republic euthanasia was not acknowledged in the centres of science and politics, although this rapidly changed after1933. The Nazi perpetrators concealed their murderous deeds, and after 1939, the discourse on euthanasia, and especially its acceptance by society, had already been superseded by the act. At the same time, the two divisions existing within the debate on euthanasia itself, had radically changed since 1933, and bore highly controversial consequences: first the endorsement of euthanasia regarding children, which was directly related to abortion , and secondly the state of national emergency during times of war. Considered less onerous, both strands of argument in favor of these forms of euthanasia affected the degree of acceptance, or at least tolerance, of the National Socialist regime`s life exterminating practice.
Herbert Elzer: Adenauer und die Saarfrage nach dem Scheitern der EVG. Die Pariser Gespraeche vom Oktober 1954
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer attended the Paris conference held on October 19, 1954, with every intention of settling the Saar question even at the cost of making considerable concessions, which were demanded by France in return for recognition of West German sovereignty and acceptance of West German NATO membership. Basically Adenauer wanted a proviso on a peace treaty as indispensable to his Deutschlandpolitik., human rights of the Saarland population insured and the economic interests of the Saarland safeguarded. The future of the Saar's state's rights seemed not as important to Adenauer, since he counted on European integration. The German side's compliant negotiation style failed, and the conference adjourned on October 23 with a very faulty Saar statue. How much Adenauer was prepared to concede, however, was not made known to the main party leaders who were summoned to Paris after the talks.
Harald Rosenbach: Der Preis der Freiheit. Die deutsch-amerikanischen Verhandlungen ueber den Devisenausgleich
Compared to the other Nato members, the Federal Republic of Germany was America's model partner. There existed, however, a less harmonious side beyond the surface official ties. The question of compensating the foreign exchange deficit incurred by the stationing of US troops in the Federal Republic was a recurring source of tension between Bonn and Washington since the mid 1960's. Because of the interdependence between money and security, negotiations were conducted with great doggedness, at times with considerable severity. During the summer of 1966 the discussion concerning alleged "payment" for the stationing of US troops intensified in the Federal Republic of Germany, with the American threatening to withdraw their troops and the Germans referring to their budget. The fact that in 1966 Chancellor Erhard returned from the United States emptyhanded became on of the factors which led to his fall several weeks later.
Rainer A Blasius: Voelkerfreundschaft am Nil: Aegypten und die DDR im Februar 1965. Stenographische Aufzeichnungen aus dem Ministerium fuer Auswaertige Angelegenheiten ueber den Ulbricht-Besuch bei Nasser
The invitation to visit Egypt extended by Gamal Abdel Nasser on January 24, 1965 was a triumph in foreign policy for Walter Ulbricht. During his only stay in a non-communist country from February 24 to March 2, 1965 the 72-year-old head of the GDR had himself honored as the "first German head of state" in Cairo and as the "spokesman for all peace loving Germans". The Federal republic of Germany`s claim to sole representation was on shaky ground as never before, and the growing Near East crisis entered a critical phase especially after Bonn`s secret arms delivery to Tel Aviv was discovered in 1964. Chancellor Ludwig Erhard finally reacted with a statement on March 7, 1965: he intended to exchange ambassadors with Israel, he would cease all economic aid to Egypt, and he would instantly stop sending weapons to the area of tension. What precise goals were pursued by Ulbricht and the United Arab Republic were not known until now, although the information in East Berlin at that time was the recognition of the GDR was not on the agenda during Ulbricht`s "goodwill visit to the Nile". Records of the priority talks held between Ulbricht and Nasser on February 25 and February 27, 1965, and transcripts of the talks between the two foreign ministers, Lothar Bolz and mahmoud Fawzi, on February 27, 1965, reveal the tenacious struggle to arrive at a mutually satisfactory declaration of cooperation between the United Arab Republic and the GDR, as well as the futile attempt to establish diplomatic relations with East Berlin and Cairo. Vividly rendered are Ulbricht`s schoolmasterish accounts of the GDR`s domestic accomplishments, the problems of the "transition from capitalism to socialism" and of the special conflict situation with West Germany".
Manfred Kittel, Daniela Neri, Thomas Raithel, Andreas Wirsching
Faktoren der Stabilitaet und Instabilitaet in der Demokratie der Zwischenkriegszeit. Ein vergleichendes Forschungskolloquium des Instituts fuer Zeitgeschichte zur deutschen und franzoesischen Geschichte
Juergen Zarusky: Widerstand als "Hochverrat" 1933-1945. Ein abgeschlossenes Editionsprojekt des Instituts fuer Zeitgeschichte
Mitarbeiter dieses Hefts
Rainer A. Blasius
Redaktion Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte
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