Titel
Kaiser Wilhelm II..


Autor(en)
Clark, Christopher
Reihe
Profiles in Power
Erschienen
Anzahl Seiten
xvi + 271pp. Notes, bibliography and index
Preis
US-$ 13.95
Rezensiert für H-Soz-Kult von
Thomas E. Nutter

The Last Kaiser Reconsidered.

The Kaiserreich, and particularly the reign of Wilhelm II, continues to provoke strong interest among historians of Germany. This has been manifested in the last decade by the publication of a number of impressive works on the subject by John C.G. Rohl, Lamar Cecil, Roderick R. McLean, Volker Berghahn, James Retallack and others. Lest we think, however, that this wealth of scholarship has provided conclusive answers to all of the issues presented by this complex period of German history, we have Christopher Clark's fine Kaiser Wilhelm II to remind us that difficult questions still remain.

Clark's work, part of the Profiles in Power series, is a testament to the value that such series may represent for both professional and student alike. As Clark notes, the guidelines of this particular series required him to focus upon "the character and extent of the Kaiser's power, his political goals and his success in achieving them, and the mechanisms by which he projected authority and exercised influence." Clark avoids the issue of "personal rule" and makes no pretense of having made new discoveries in the primary sources, admitting that his is a work of synthesis and interpretation. His purpose, given these parameters, is to ask (and suggest an answer to) the question as to whether and to what extent it made a difference that Wilhelm II occupied the German throne between 1888 and 1918. Clark achieves his goal admirably.

In a work whose subject is power, Clark begins with an examination of the power relationships in Wilhelm's unique family. Clark characterizes the division of power between Wilhelm's father, Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, and his grandfather, Kaiser Wilhelm I ("a figure of almost mythical reputation with the gravitas and whiskers of a biblical patriarch") as the single most influential fact of Wilhelm's early life. He illustrates the pernicious effect upon Wilhelm's development created by his grandfather's ability and willingness to interfere in the child's education, among other things. This regrettable state of affairs was exacerbated by the political tensions that had riven the Hohenzollern court since the early 1850's, namely the struggle between the western-oriented progressives and the more reactionary pro-Russian faction. The resolution of this controversy by the ascendancy of Otto von Bismarck in 1862 affected the Crown Prince and his family profoundly. The animus of the Prussian minister-president for Friedrich Wilhelm and Crown Princess Victoria isolated them and their children politically and socially, with the result that Wilhelm's education and general upbringing became a bone of contention between his parents, on the one hand, and his grandfather and Bismarck, on the other. Considering Wilhelm's later irresolution in circumstances where stouter resolve might have better served both him and Germany, Clark reasonably asks whether it might not have been better for one or the other of these competing factions to have prevailed unequivocally.

Eventually Wilhelm learned to adapt to and exploit for his own purposes the atmosphere of conflict that surrounded him. As he matured, he elected increasingly to side with his grandfather's apparently stronger faction, much to the chagrin of his parents. He widened the rift so created by marrying Augusta Victoria of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderberg-Augustenburg, a woman whose politics proved to epitomize those of Friedrich Wilhelm's most ardent opponents; and by adopting as his most trusted confidant General Count Alfred von Waldersee, quartermaster-general of the Prussian army and deputy chief of the general staff, and a man who "was the personification of everything Wilhelm's parents most detested." In the end, Wilhelm seemed to have backed the right horse, since Bismarck and the conservatives remained the premier force in German politics, surviving intact and in power following the deaths of both Wilhelm I and Friedrich Wilhelm (Kaiser Friedrich III). Clark suggests, however, that Wilhelm's success in this regard was illusory; while he had learned well how to successfully play the power game, he knew not what to do with the power once it became his.

One of Clark's most significant contributions in this work is his explication of the imperial constitution and Wilhelm II's relationship to it. The author refers to the "extreme federalism" of the constitution of 1871, observing that it reduced the Kaiser to the status of one prince among others, without a claim to dominion over the territory of the Reich. There was, in addition, the curious dualism of parallel imperial and Prussian state governments, in which the imperial chancellor was also the Prussian prime minister, responsible to both the imperial Reichstag and the Prussian Landtag. With responsibility also came a substantial quantity of political control in both the Reich and Prussia, and between 1871 and 1890 that control was in the hands of the formidable Otto von Bismarck. As Clark observes, Bismarck's power and control had its source not merely in his political offices, but also in the status and reputation acquired from his role in unification, domestic and foreign policy, and relationship with the Kaiser. That relationship, of course, was a difficult one, characterized by conflict over issues such as labor policy, imperial administration, and Wilhelm's reliance upon personal advisors other than the chancellor. This conflict led to Bismarck's forced resignation in March 1890. In the roughly two years since ascending the throne, Wilhelm had changed that office from a passive to an active source of power, and in so doing had removed one of the principal obstacles to the exercise of power from the throne. Clark argues that Wilhelm achieved this by emulating, as much as he was able, the political acumen and ruthlessness of the first chancellor.

After Bismarck's departure, Wilhelm had the unenviable task of governing without him. The 1890's were marked by the advent of a new political paradigm in Germany, the more staid politics of the former era giving way to a far more factional model in which both the right and left became more vocal and contentious. Clark argues that Wilhelm responded to this situation by seeking to enlarge the middle ground in German politics and place the throne within it. For the Kaiser, the political center comprised patriotic Germans accepting of technology and opposed to socialism. Wilhelm's efforts to galvanize this group involved mediation of conflicts, persuading conservatives and moderates to take common cause against "agreed enemies of the social order", and aligning the monarchy in support of important national projects. But the Kaiser's initiatives came to naught, Clark contends, because of weakness of character. He was unable to use his power effectively in part because his apparently innate rudeness, indiscretion and lack of objectivity alienated friend and foe alike. Moreover, he lacked discipline and was emotionally erratic. Unable to govern with his ministers, he now came into conflict with both the provincial and imperial legislatures. His unsuccessful efforts to sponsor unpopular legislation in these venues had the additional deleterious effect of inciting public opinion against him.

The Kaiser's imperial career wanted guidance, and found it in the person of Bernhard von Buelow, Wilhelm's imperial state secretary for foreign affairs from 1897 and chancellor from 1900 until 1909. Clark qualifies the view that the advent of von Buelow brought about a system of "institutionalized personal rule" in which the key departments of the Reich government were dominated by Wilhelm's hand-picked functionaries, thereby avoiding more clumsy interference in governmental affairs by the Kaiser. It is the author's view that even before he became a government minister, and indeed throughout his tenure, von Buelow intended to and did manipulate Wilhelm. He did this chiefly by controlling the Prussian and Reich ministries, thereby depriving the Kaiser of the opportunity to scheme against him in conjunction with other ministers. Moreover, until 1903 von Buelow managed to convince Wilhelm that the latter, rather than his chief minister, was in control and responsible for the monarchy's record of success both at home and abroad. In 1905-6, however, the relationship between the two men began to unravel. The first clash between them occurred over the so-called "Treaty of Bjorko", one of mutual defense negotiated by Wilhelm with his cousin Tsar Nicholas II of Russia. Von Buelow refused to execute the agreement; his threat to resign over the incident forced Wilhelm to renounce it. In the ensuing months the Kaiser began to purposefully reassert his authority over the appointment of ministers, and to actively undermine the course of conciliation that von Buelow had adopted toward the Catholic Centre Party. In Clark's view, Wilhelm's uprising against von Buelow during these years demonstrates that, far from being a merely symbolic ruler with little means to exercise political power, the Kaiser possessed the ability to create mischief, if nothing else, by virtue of his ability to make imperial administrative appointments. Nevertheless, Clark maintains, Wilhelm undercut his own influence by his failure to articulate a consistent national political program.

With the coming of Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg to the chancellorship in July 1909, the monarchy began to take on a different political aspect. Wilhelm knew Bethmann well and respected him, and saw in him something of a political ally against the imperial legislature. In point of fact, Clark contends, these facts did not particularly favor the Kaiser and certainly did not facilitate his "personal rule" in the Reich. Like his predecessor, Bethmann asserted his position as president of the Prussian state ministry to remove ministers with whom he differed or in whom he lacked confidence and replace them with men to whom he was more sympathetically inclined. In all of this, Wilhelm took little meaningful role. As a result, Bethmann was able to effectively undercut one of the Kaiser's last remaining levers of power, namely his capacity to select imperial administrators of his own choosing. Clark makes the point that this "marginalization" of Wilhelm from domestic politics had the effect of enhancing the importance of the Kaiser's Kommandogewalt, his extra-parliamentary power to command his military subordinates, the most significant remaining facet of his sovereignty. This was reflected in Wilhelm's handling of the Zabern affair, the effect of which was to place him squarely against the tide of liberal feeling in the Reich. In any case, the first fourteen years of the new century saw the advent of aggressive political blocs that rendered more and more ineffectual the power and influence of the monarchy in the legislatures.

Clark spends an entire chapter on the subject of Wilhelm and popular opinion, and it is time well spent. The author rejects the traditional view that Wilhelm's often unfortunate attempts to court the public stemmed from a narcissistic personality disorder. He sees it, instead, as an eminently reasonable approach for the Kaiser to take in view of his own regard for the power of the press, made evident, as he saw it, by its often irreverent tone since the end of the Bismarckian era. While Wilhelm may have acted rationally, this does not mean he did so reasonably, and Clark assigns to him the responsibility for this. Indeed, Clark maintains that Wilhelm damaged his reputation much more by what he said than by what he did. This was due to his inherent inability to express himself in the "sober, measured diction" expected of him. The manifestations of this unfortunate trait were both numerous and egregious. His Bremerhaven speech in 1900 on the embarkation of the German contingent for China during the Boxer rebellion identified Germans with the Hun despoilers of the Roman Empire. The publication in 1908 by the London Daily Telegraph of an interview given by him that was perceived as discrediting both the Kaiser and the German nation led to public outrage and open, virulent criticism of him in the Reichstag. In spite of these gaffes, however, or perhaps because of them, Clark points out that Wilhelm continued to enjoy widespread popularity among the humbler orders of German society, a situation changed only by the events of the First World War.

Wilhelm is perhaps most well known as an actor on the international stage, both before and during the Great War. The author presents the question whether the Kaiser succeeded in placing himself in charge of German foreign policy, an aspiration of his since long before his accession. Clark's answer is equivocal. While Wilhelm's profile in foreign relations was a high one, his real significance was marginal, as demonstrated by, for example, his inability to secure the renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty after Bismarck's departure, notwithstanding his strong personal bias in favor of renewal. Clark identifies Wilhelm's principal deficiency as his total lack of a coherent policy position in the area of foreign affairs. As a result his chief ministers were able to manipulate Wilhelm for their own purposes. The one area in which Wilhelm was able to exert substantial influence was in the decision to expand and modernize the German Navy, and embark upon a naval race with Great Britain. In this connection, the author presents a somewhat unique view of Wilhelm's role in the affair of the "Kruger telegram", pointing out that he was not alone in favoring German military intervention in the Transvaal, and that the sending of the telegram was the result of a true consensus, rather than an attempt to control a Kaiser out of touch with reality. Clark's significant contribution in this regard is to suggest that, while the telegram offended Queen Victoria and outraged the British government and press, "there is no reason why this response should be the touchstone for our own judgments." He goes on to remark upon the "perplexing tendency" of the literature on the subject to "accept implicitly the notion that British colonial expansion and British perceptions of British rights constituted a 'natural order', in the light of which German objections appeared to be wanton provocations." This bespeaks an openness of mind that would be pleasant to see reflected in the work of other scholars of German history. Perhaps equally controversial is Clark's view on the Kaiser's role in Germany's pre-war isolation. While he concedes that Wilhelm's attempts at intervention may have made the lives of his foreign ministers difficult, he attributes Germany's encirclement to the confusion and irresolution of the German foreign policy establishment, whose origins lay not with Wilhelm, but with Bismarck.

What of Wilhelm's role in the coming of the Great War? On this question, Clark emphasizes the critical necessity of considering the Kaiser's speech and action in context. On this basis, he rejects the view that Wilhelm's commitment to Austria in particular, and his power as sovereign in general, were fatal for Germany. Instead, Clark argues that the record supports the conclusion that Wilhelm's commitment to Austria was not uncritical, and that in fact his willingness to proffer German support depended upon his assessment of the rectitude of Austria's cause and his understanding of the risks involved. Indeed, the evidence he marshals in support of this argument, for example with regard to Wilhelm's words and deeds in connection with the Bosnian crisis of 1908 and the First Balkan War of 1912, amply support his thesis, showing as they do a Kaiser wary of international conflict. So also with Wilhelm's actions in the prewar crisis. The record presented by Clark runs decidedly counter to the notion that Wilhelm was in the camp of those who saw in Austria's confrontation with Serbia an opportunity to initiate war and thereby gain an advantage. The Kaiser portrayed here is one who consistently urged caution as the key to German policy, abjured the idea of a preventive war, and generally warned all who would listen against war. Clark's point here is that, while historians and others have often characterized Wilhelm's pacific utterances as hypocritical "camouflage for a fundamentally belligerent diplomacy", in fact his private remarks to all and sundry, German or otherwise, were consistent with a conciliatory posture. With regard to the July crisis of 1914, Clark contrasts the "Blank Cheque" episode with Wilhelm's attempts, on July 28, to defuse tensions based on the Serbian response to the Austrian ultimatum of two days earlier. The Kaiser told his secretary of state for foreign affairs, Gottlieb von Jagow, that Serbia's response amounted to a "capitulation of the most humiliating kind", and ordered him to inform the Austrians that there was no longer any cause for war and that Wilhelm would mediate for peace. These instructions, however, were not followed, providing further evidence of the Kaiser's isolation from the center of power. When war itself came, Wilhelm continued to be marginalized, although not without significant influence. Clark argues effectively that things would not have been the same without him; his power of appointment kept Falkenhayn in office, and Wilhelm delayed the advent of unlimited submarine warfare because of his support for Bethmann's policy of restraint.

Christopher Clark's Kaiser Wilhelm II is well written, carefully reasoned and provocative. It occupies a valuable place in the recent literature on this important period in German history.

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